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Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Summary of Proceedings*
PANEL 1: HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDELINES
Moderator: Abraham S. Goldstein, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School
Judge Edward Becker, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
The impetus behind the creation of the federal sentencing guidelines arose
from widespread concern about increased crime, the perception that tougher
sentences would decrease crime, and the recognition of widespread disparity
in sentencing. Although the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal Law
and Probation tried to preempt the guidelines with its own program to develop
a common law of sentencing, that proposal was too little and came too late.
Once the idea for sentencing guidelines took hold, Congress could not resist
the hydraulic pressures. Given today's political reality, it is too late to turn back
to the old system, even though that system worked reasonably well, except at
the margins.
* The following is a summary of a conference that was held at Yale Law School on February 28-29,
1992. This summary was compiled by the editors of The Yale Law Journal and highlights the prominent
themes explored by the conference's participants. Each summary represents the viewpoint of the particular
speaker, though not necessarily the views of the organization with which he or she is affiliated.
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The guidelines are fraught with problems. The overwhelming judicial
opinion is that they are unduly rigid and harsh, and give too much power to
prosecutors. Moreover, the guidelines have created a new form of disparity:
instead of treating like defendants differently as the previous sentencing regime
did, the guidelines treat offenders with dissimilar offenses and backgrounds
similarly. If the guidelines are to serve their purpose, judges should have much
more flexibility and built-in injustices must be eliminated. For example, me-
chanical ratcheting of the offense level for fraud and drug crimes according to
the dollar amount involved is unjust. There are better measures of culpability.
Adjustments for acceptance of responsibility and role in the offense should
be calibrated on a proportionality theory, rather than by a straight two to four
level adjustment. These reductions make a difference at lower offense levels,
but not at high levels. Therefore, the current scheme not only discourages pleas
but also creates injustice. Although the courts should not be involved in the 5K
reduction decision, some measure of unrecognized but bona fide cooperation
should be factored into acceptance of responsibility. Often the "little fish"
cooperates his heart out but has nothing much to offer. Moreover, present
interpretations of "relevant conduct" cast too broad a net.
Although the architecture of the guidelines requires departures for their
continued refinement, departure rates vary considerably by region. Some
districts have high departure rates, but others are extremely low. Thus, the
message of the importance of departures has not gotten out. The courts of
appeals have not helped the situation because much of their jurisprudence
discourages departures. The Commission's actions have been discouraging as
well. While the guidelines themselves recite the importance of departures, the
Commission's reaction to departures sends the opposite message. For example,
when a combination of age and physical condition was recently and sensibly
used as a basis for departure in United States v. Lara,1 the Commission,
pursuant to what almost seems a reflexive "plug the loophole" mindset, soon
eliminated this possibility.
The guidelines are also too rigid in foreclosing probation, alternative
sentencing, and home confinement. Perhaps pending amendments will partially
rectify this situation, but more needs to be done, especially in granting more
flexibility to consider offender characteristics. The lack of flexibility in the
guidelines has forced district court judges into a mechanical jurisprudence.
There is a mood of resignation among district judges that needs to be relieved.
Another problem is that fundamental unfairness is built into the guidelines
because the rules of evidence do not apply in sentencing.2 Before the guide-
lines, judges had discretion to consider inadmissible evidence, but its impact
was easily dissipated in light of the total discretion of the sentencing judge.
1. 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
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Under the guidelines, however, such evidence controls a sentence, driving up
the range. Under the guidelines regime, evidence only needs to pass a minimal
constitutional standard to be admissible, and thus facts found on the basis of
such evidence by a mere preponderance (the lowest evidentiary standard) can
result in a far higher sentence than the offense of conviction justifies. When
the sentencing hearing is the tail that wags the dog of the substantive offense,
perhaps due process requires more than a minimum indicium of reliability, and
a higher standard of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence, should be
applied. Federal Rule of Evidence 1 101(d)(3) should therefore be reconsidered.
The Commission performed brilliantly in its study of mandatory minimums
and in certain other areas, but it has been listening too much of late to political
rhetoric. The Commission should devote more energy to eradicating injustices
created by the guidelines and listen more to reports of unfairness. It needs to
exercise courage and independent judgment. It should, like other agencies, seek
appropriate amendments to its enabling statute. The Commission should ask
Congress, for example, to expand the ranges, because Article III judges can be
trusted in sentencing matters, at least within limits.
Finally, given their onerous and awesome responsibilities, the Commission
members should be full-time Commissioners and the judicial members should
be relieved of their judicial duties. Commissioners should be treated statutorily
like the Director of the Federal Judicial Center, so that, when a judge is
appointed to the Commission, a vacancy is created on the bench, and the
Commissioner's position in the district or circuit can be filled. When the term
as Commissioner expires, the judge can then return to duty.
In the present climate, there is no hope of getting Congress to agree to
"advisory guidelines." While guidelines should be given more of a chance, they
can achieve the laudable goals for which they were developed only if their
shortcomings are remedied.
Joe B. Brown, former U.S. Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee
The Commission is considering a proposal to allow judges to depart
downward for a defendant's substantial assistance in the prosecution of others.
This proposal should be rejected. In its preliminary draft of the guidelines in
1986, the Commission proposed fixed amounts of reduction for substantial
assistance based on the degree of assistance. Significant information would be
worth a twenty-percent reduction; exceptional assistance would be worth forty
percent. The Commission did not adopt the proposal, however, because the
Commissioners felt they needed more experience and because of the subjective
nature of the motion. Albeit for different reasons, the Commission should also
reject the current proposal.
The present downward departure proposal has several flaws. First, it would
create added disparity among defendants who are charged under minimum
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mandatory statutes. Judges would only be able to grant reductions to defendants
who were not under minimum mandatory statutes or whose guidelines ranges
were well above any applicable minimum sentences. Second, it would tend to
remove the prosecutor from the decision loop because a prosecutor who did
not feel that a reduction was warranted would not recommend a specific
reduction, thus leaving the departure truly unguided. Third, it would encourage
judges who believe the present guidelines are too high to grant reduction in
inappropriate cases in order to bring the sentence down to a level the judge
feels is "fair." Finally, it would allow defendants to force their services on the
prosecutor in some cases. A defendant who is the leader of a criminal group
would not normally be offered the chance to assist against those who are lower
in the organization than himself, but this proposal would allow a defense
attorney and his client in effect to force cooperation on the government by
saying to the judge: "Look, my defendant gave the government all this informa-
tion and they ignored it. Give us a reduction because we did provide informa-
tion."
Currently, a sentence below the minimum can be imposed only on a
prosecutor's motion for reduction.3 The prosecutor's motion allows all defen-
dants to be considered for a reduction, even those subject to mandatory mini-
mum sentences. The prosecutor must retain the ability to make the final deci-
sion, absent bad faith, on whether to accept offers of assistance.
This substantial assistance motion is a very powerful tool, especially with
the high minimum sentences in drug crimes. Prosecutors have the power to
introduce disparity into the system through motions for reduction, especially
since once the motion is made there is no limit on how far the judge may
depart. Prosecutors have a strong trump card in section 5Kl.1, and they are in
the best position to evaluate a defendant's assistance. They must, however, use
it wisely and fairly or it will be taken away.
In a recent revision of the U.S. Attorneys Manual, the Justice Department
required U.S. Attorneys to approve substantial assistance motions and plea
agreements at a senior supervisory level in the office and to maintain a record
of their reasons for the plea or motion. The Department and the Commission
need to continue to review pleas and substantial assistance motions to ensure
that they do not undermine the fairness and uniformity the guidelines have
brought to the system.
The guidelines are working well, and we should use the amendment process
to fine-tune them rather than unnecessarily rewrite them.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988).
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Benson B. Weintraub, Partner, Sonnett, Sale & Kuehne, Miami, Florida
Prior to the guidelines the exercise of unfettered sentencing discretion
frequently resulted in disparate sentences due, in large measure, to the lack of
statutory guidance or an instructive common law with respect to the purposes
of sentencing. The guidelines help to remedy this problem by providing a sense
of structure and symmetry through which the penalty phase of a criminal case
can be analyzed with due regard for the purposes of sentencing and weighted
factors such as relative culpability, role in the offense, specific offense charac-
teristics, criminal history, and offender characteristics, which are ordinarily rele-
vant.
The current sentencing literature and emerging case law has convinced me
that we have come a full circle in terms of the exercise of judicial discretion
at sentencing. In 1949, the Supreme Court underscored the broad discretion
vested in sentencing judges in Williams v. New York. Criminal sentences could
be imposed on the basis of a broad range of information without regard to its
admissibility in other proceedings. The discretion contemplated in Williams was
based on a rehabilitative model of sentencing. Today, however, the Sentencing
Reform Act explicitly rejects rehabilitation, except in the most limited circum-
stances, and codifies sentencing purposes that are largely retributive,
incapacitative, and deterrent. In short, the current statute seeks to further a
system of offender accountability.
We are entering a period heralded by the courts' reacquisition of authority
and control over the traditional exercise of sentencing discretion. Through
serious reexamination of the guidelines and their enabling legislation, we should
seek to take advantage of the structure provided by the Sentencing Reform Act
without sacrificing the need to tailor the punishment to fit the offender as well
as the offense. To this day, judges and litigants alike grant far too much weight
to the guidelines, which perpetuates the self-fulfilling prophecy that courts must
strictly adhere to them. Instead, it is incumbent on all members of the court
family to ask threshold questions in each case to determine whether the results
produced by the guidelines are consistent with the mandate of the Sentencing
Reform Act. For example, the guidelines state that the court shall impose a sen-
tence which is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the purposes
of sentencing.5 The Sentencing Reform Act therefore incorporates the principle
of parsimony favoring imposition of the least restrictive sanction necessary to
achieve defined social goals.
The concept of "relevant conduct" is not new. Traditionally, judges have
been empowered to consider unadjudicated offense conduct in determining an
appropriate sanction. Until now, courts have generally employed an expansive
4. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
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view of relevant conduct. Relevant conduct--coupled with judicial factfinding
and the burden of proof-is the valve through which criminal sentences can
be moderated. Relevant conduct and the burden of proof are instrumentalities
through which judges can reacquire judicial control over the sentencing process.
Yet during the first two years of the guidelines, judges seemed compelled to
impose sentences with the guidelines, accepting the Sentencing Commission's
guidelines and nonbinding policy statements one hundred percent. Interestingly,
the recent trend is toward the imposition of more result-driven guideline
sentences and the reacquisition of judicial discretion within the framework
provided by the guidelines. It is now becoming apparent that the Sentencing
Commission sold us all a "bill of goods." In particular, the Commission's
interpretation of § 3553(b) clearly discourages departure notwithstanding the
legislative history of the Act indicating that each sentencing judge is under an
"obligation" to consider whether a departure is appropriate in any given case.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 marked the beginning of the develop-
ment of a federal common law of sentencing. It codified rules and regulations
to "guide" the exercise of sentencing discretion. Now that we have a statutory
framework, case law, and the sense of an evolving common law, sentencing
is likely to be governed by a more informed sense of discretion. Informed
discretion and guided discretion should be the hallmark of sentencing in the
1990's.
Judge A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts;
Member, U.S. Sentencing Commission
The guidelines are here to stay. Thus, the real question is whether they are
fair, rational, and proportional. A careful evaluation of the Sentencing Reform
Act provides a favorable answer to this question.
In response to criticism that the guidelines are too harsh, it is important to
recognize that the guidelines reflect two kinds of severity. First, the severity
of an offense is driven up by mandatory minimums. The Commission has
responded to this problem by publishing reports and press releases condemning
mandatory minimums as inconsistent with the guidelines' concepts of propor-
tionality and fairness. Unfortunately, however, the Commission cannot reject
Congress' proposals. Second, there is severity driven by the guidelines them-
selves. In fact, the guidelines were patterned after past sentencing practices and
thus have preserved the sentencing pattern in place before the guidelines for
most crimes. White-collar crimes are an exception because the Commission
made a deliberate policy decision to punish white-collar crimes more seriously.
Sentences for white-collar crime have increased mostly because the Commission
has moved away from probation, which used to be awarded frequently in white-
collar cases.
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Another important objection to the guidelines is the restriction of the factors
considered in sentencing. Congress stated that age, sex, employment, education,
community service, and religion should not normally be considered. But
Congress did not say that these factors should not lead to departures, and the
Commission has stated that judges should depart in atypical cases, stating their
reasons for departing. Yet, in spite of this statement, there have not been many
departures.
Critics also argue that sentencing under the guidelines is too time-consum-
ing. This is not the case. Civil cases in general require a great deal of time,
especially FDIC cases, savings and loan fraud, pollution cases, class actions,
and other complex litigation matters. The guidelines do not occupy more time
than is warranted by sentencing decisions. Time spent on sentencing is time
well spent.
It is true that the Commission needs to do more work. The Commission
should study recidivism, study criminal justice theories, and determine where
it has erred in promulgating the Sentencing Reform Act. When evaluating the
effectiveness of the guidelines, it is important to remember that the public, not
the judiciary, is the ultimate consumer of the sentencing guidelines.
PANEL 2: SENTENCING AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
Moderator: Kate Stith, Professor of Law, Yale Law School
Judy Clarke, former Federal Public Defender, Partner, McKenna & Cuneo, San
Diego, California
The sentencing guidelines are an unmitigated disaster. In the past four and
a half years, seven versions of the guidelines have been published, with 434
amendments. There are over 2200 published opinions on guideline issues as
well as amendments responding to many opinions. The circuits have developed
splits in many areas. Keeping current or even reasonably educated is a night-
mare.
Disparity has increased under the guidelines. Under the pre-guidelines
regime, the sentence a client could expect depended in large part on which
judge she had. With the guidelines, it depends on which prosecutor, which
probation officer, which judge, and which circuit. A recent First Circuit case
illustrates the problem. 'two similarly situated defendants were sentenced at
separate hearings. The government proved a certain level of relevant conduct
at the first hearing, and a twenty-seven month sentence resulted. At the second
defendant's hearing, the government was substantially better prepared, and
proved a greater quantity of drugs were involved, resulting in a guideline range
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of 89-108 months. The district judge decided to equalize the sentences at
twenty-seven months, and the government appealed. The First Circuit reversed,
however, and so the second similarly situated defendant received a much longer
sentence than the first defendant because the government's quality of proof
changed.
The Commission blames many of the guidelines' problems on mandatory
minimums. Yet, it decided to lock into mandatory minimums as floors for
guideline sentencing ranges. If the Commission really believed the minimums
were unfair and inappropriate, it could have made the minimums the guideline
ceilings. The Commission should prescribe the sentences it deems appropriate,
and let Congress take the heat for unduly harsh minimums.
Guideline sentences for drug crimes are driven by quantity. For sentencing
purposes, the quantity of drugs is determined by the preponderance of the
evidence standard. Therefore, many defendants face sentences based on conduct
for which they have been acquitted. Drug enforcement agents are trained about
the guidelines so that they know what evidence to collect. Negotiated amounts
can increase sentences, and many times undercover agents suggest the amount.
Defendants in state courts are advised not to file certain motions or the state
prosecutor will send the case to federal court. One federal judge thought this
practice was unfair and sentenced the defendant according to state law, but
courts of appeals have not sustained this reasoning.
Another significant problem with the guidelines is their terrible racial
impact. A Los Angeles judge recently commented that "young white male
prosecutors are making their careers on the backs of black and brown defen-
dants." Statistics compiled by the Federal Judicial Center reflect increased racial
disparity in sentencing for drug offenses with or without mandatory minimum
penalties. Mandatory minimums have driven the increase in racial disparity, but
the guidelines also play a role. The Commission needs to take responsibility
for this racial disparity and change it.
The Commission continues to dehumanize the sentencing process. One
circuit upheld a departure for a homosexual defendant based on the difficulty
he would face in prison and another granted a departure based on the
defendant's military record. The Commission then amended the guidelines to
take away such authority, stating that physical problems and military record are
not relevant in sentencing. The Commission should trust life-tenured judges
more and prosecutorial discretion less. Judges should exercise greater discretion;
they should take advantage of their authority and refuse to abdicate to unfair
guideline sentences.
The guidelines should be abandoned. Disparity under them is terrible;
sentences are too harsh; and the guidelines themselves are ridiculously compli-
cated. We should consider the more rational reforms of sentencing institutes,
appellate review, and requiring statements of reasons for sentences.
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Margaret A. Grove, Deputy Chief for Policy, Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs
Section, Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
Stiff sentences for drug offenses are part of a comprehensive federal
strategy for combating the evils of drug trafficking. In the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, Congress explicitly adopted a "market-oriented" sentencing
approach that directly tied the punishment to the quantity of the drug actually
distributed. By predicating punishment on the amount of drugs, rather than the
defendant's role in the offense, Congress reasonably determined that the
punishment should reflect the harm to society caused by the drugs distributed
by a particular defendant-a harm that is demonstrably greater as the amount
of drugs increases.
Although others believe that mandatory minimum sentences are incompati-
ble with the guidelines, they actually substantially further the goals of the
sentencing guidelines. These minimums set important baselines for guideline
sentences that reinforce the concepts of certainty and predictability of punish-
ment. By requiring mandatory minimum penalties for certain egregious crimes,
Congress has sent a clear and concise message that no excuses are acceptable
from those who commit the crimes that are most detrimental to society.
Drug trafficking is a crime of violence. Minimum mandatory sentences
serve the important public policy goal of enhancing public safety by ensuring
that dangerous offenders are incapacitated for substantial periods. The enact-
ment of tough federal statutes for drug-trafficking offenses reflects a determina-
tion on the part of Congress and the President to commit federal law enforce-
ment resources to combating violent crimes in those areas in which the federal
government has concurrent jurisdiction with the states.
Some critics argue that a prosecutor's discretion to charge defendants with
crimes that have mandatory minimum sentences violates due process or some-
how arrogates the powers of the judiciary to prosecutors. Yet the prosecution
has always had the discretion to seek indictments for multiple levels of crime
with varying degrees of punishment. The existence of mandatory minimum
sentences merely adds teeth to the prosecutor's decision; it does not change the
nature of that decision. More importantly, the allegedly enhanced prosecutorial
discretion is mostly illusory. In all but exceptional cases, such as those in which
the defendant has provided substantial assistance to the government, federal
prosecutors are required to charge the most serious readily provable offense.
Thus, the Justice Department's policy supports the guidelines' goal of reducing
sentencing disparity by ensuring that, absent extraordinary circumstances, like
offenses are charged with like crimes that have like penalties.
Mandatory minimum sentences are unique weapons in the prosecutor's
arsenal. Because the only statutory exception to minimum punishments for drug
offenses is for defendants who provide "substantial assistance" in the prosecu-
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tion of other drug criminals, mandatory minimums provide a powerful induce-
ment for a defendant to cooperate and provide information to law enforcement.
Congress enacted mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and the sentenc-
ing guidelines to address three problems: sentencing disparity, misleading
sentences that were shorter than they appeared as a result of parole and unduly
generous "good time" allowances, and inadequate sentences in critical areas,
including crimes of violence and drug-trafficking offenses. The guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences were specifically designed to limit judicial
discretion and to require judges to impose sentences that conformed to
Congress' determination of the seriousness of a particular crime.
In the current climate of pervasive violent and drug crime, we need a strong
federal, state, and local commitment to prosecute and to punish those who
commit the most serious offenses. We need to carry out Congress' message that
egregious criminal behavior should not be tolerated. Mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions and sentencing guidelines are key components of an
effective system of punishment and incapacitation. We must work to improve
their applications, not abandon them.
Harlan W. Penn, Associate General Counsel for Legislative and Correctional
Issues, Federal Bureau of Prisons
The Bureau of Prisons' role in the sentencing process is essentially to
execute court orders that result from the sentencing guidelines and the give and
take of adversarial criminal prosecution. Defendants sentenced to imprisonment
under the guidelines are committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.6
In addition, those placed on probation may spend some time in the custody of
the Bureau of Prisons or reside in a community corrections facility of the
Bureau of Prisons.7
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Bureau of Prisons must
consider a variety of factors when making decisions regarding inmates. For
example, when determining the place of imprisonment, the Bureau considers
prison resources, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the offender, any statement of the sentencing court concerning
the purposes of the sentence or recommending a type of correctional facility,
and any pertinent policy statement from the Sentencing Commission.8 Thus,
the Sentencing Commission's actions and the courts' discretionary recommen-
dations extend beyond the imposition of a sentence to the execution of that
sentence.
These changes in the sentencing structure have placed new burdens on the
Bureau of Prisons. For example, a specific statutory mandate for drug treatment
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a) (1988).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(bXll)-(12) (1988).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
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applies to Sentencing Reform Act inmates. The need for such treatment is
evidenced by the fact that fifty-one percent of all admissions have a recent
history of substance abuse or dependency, and forty-four percent of that group
indicate a desire for treatment. In response, the Bureau is implementing several
program initiatives emphasizing mandatory education and voluntary counseling.
Comprehensive and pilot programs are focused on those nearing release with
transitional services available post-release.
Two other factors contributing to an increased burden on the Bureau of
Prisons are new laws with mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment and the
reduction of probation under the sentencing guidelines. For example, in 1985,
fifty-seven percent of those convicted of income tax violations were placed on
probation. This was projected to fall below ten percent under the new sen-
tencing laws. The percentage of drug offenders receiving probation fell from
twenty percent in 1985 to seven percent in 1989. Among those who are sen-
tenced to prison, the average length of time served has risen in several offense
categories. Robbery went from 44.8 months to 78.0 months under the new law.
Drug offenses went from 23.1 months to 28.0 months.
These changes in the use of probation and the imposition of longer real
time sentences have produced an accelerated growth in the Bureau of Prisons
inmate population. The inmate population, which was 53,347 at the end of
1989, today approaches 66,000 inmates housed in sixty-eight institutions. These
institutions are currently being operated at 145% of design capacity. Several
programming and management challenges result from this population level. To
limit inmate idleness, additional programs are being implemented where inmates
work on military bases, national forests, and other federal projects. Educational
programs have been enhanced, and English as a Second Language is a part of
the curriculum. These programs are actually mandated by statute.9 Significant
expansion of existing and new institutions requires additional staff recruitment
and training. On a management level, some have observed decreased incentives
for good behavior from inmates because of the reduced amount of sentence
reduction available for forfeiture in the disciplinary process. On the other hand,
the reduced sentence disparity and increased certainty of release date have
tended to lessen a source of frustration in the inmate population.
Chief Judge Judith N. Keep, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California
The debate over the guidelines is somewhat like the debate over abortion
in that both sides can claim the moral high ground. Regardless of morality,
however, the guidelines have proven ineffective.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(f) (1988).
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Criminal problems are not uniform, but the guidelines fail to account for
this fact. Crime varies by geographic area. Hence, a uniform application of
criminal law is not desirable because uniformity allows the largest common
denominator to control. In the Southern District of California, for example, the
number of prosecutors has tripled during a period in which the number of
judges has remained substantially the same-largely as a result of demands of
the war on drugs. The district has a particular problem because of the dense
populations on both sides of the border in the San Diego/Tijuana area. As
conditions in Mexico have deteriorated, there has been a resurgence of drug
importation over the border. In the Southern District of California, random
customs checks of cars annually result in the seizure of tons of drugs, and
63,000 thousand illegal aliens are arrested each month. Some of them are
criminals posing as migrant workers. The border area is also characterized by
dangerous border chases and a recent wave of "kamikaze dashes" in which
groups of would-be immigrants race across the border into oncoming freeway
traffic, knowing that the authorities will not be able to apprehend them all. If
high-speed chases or kamikaze border crashes are a problem in only one
district, they will not receive appropriate guideline treatment.
Yet judges have no control over available resources. The number of cases
in the Southern District is overwhelming the judiciary, but the U.S. Attorney
for the district believes he must be vigorous in prosecuting border violations,
seeking conviction above all. The Commissioners who write the guidelines have
no obligation to make the system work.
The goals of the guidelines are noble, but the guidelines themselves are
unworkable because a defendant necessarily has an incentive to plead, and plea
bargaining leads to disparities. The ultimate disparity, however, arises from not
prosecuting at all, which the increasing caseload has necessitated. We will never
achieve uniformity in sentencing as long as the states retain their police power.
The discretion of the prosecutor and probation officer under the guidelines is
worse than judicial discretion ever was. The current system is therefore more
unjust than the prior system. Prisoners serving twelve years or more will never
have a chance in society. We must ask which is worse: a few judges giving
unduly harsh sentences, or a system in which all judges must do so? Judges
do not miss power for power's sake, but for the ability to sentence justly.
Gerald B. Toflat, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Two issues have arisen in this panel: the effect of the war on drugs on
society and problems with the sentencing process. These two issues are separate
and distinct problems.
The Eleventh Circuit recently spent thirty minutes hearing oral argument
in a personal injury case in which a six-year-old struck a four-year-old in the
eye in a K-mart store, and the four-year-old's mother was seeking to hold K-
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mart liable for the injury. It is mind-boggling to compare the time spent in that
case to the time spent in determining whether to sentence someone to twenty
years in prison. We have lost our perspective when we complain about the time
spent on sentencing decisions.
The former sentencing system did not require judges to state their reasons
for a sentence even though judges must give reasons for nearly every other
dispositive decision they make. A rational judicial system requires nothing less
than justification for sentencing decisions as well. The present guidelines system
provides benchmarks for sentencing. Most of the complaints about the guideline
scheme focus on what the Commission has done with its mandate, not on
whether we should have a rational sentencing scheme with appellate review.
Practitioners are woefully undereducated about the guidelines. They must
educate themselves because judges cannot be required to perform the roles of
the adversaries. Unfortunately, lawyers are not examining the areas of possible
departures. By focusing extensively on the characteristics of defendants, lawyers
have overlooked possible departures based on the nature of the offense. Law-
yers need to bring to the court's attention the areas in which judges have the
authority to depart. Reasonable departures would lead to fair sentences, not
unwarranted disparity.
Lawyers have also failed to litigate burden of proof issues. In every area
of the law, the greater the sanction that might be imposed, the greater the
burden of proof we require. This sliding scale should apply to sentencing. If
a given fact is going to ratchet a sentence up many levels, the required burden
of proof should be greater than the standard of proof for a fact with little effect
on a sentence. Lawyers should appeal the use of aggravating facts to increase
a sentence when such facts have not been established according to an appropri-
ate standard of proof. Enhancing a sentence with inadequately proven facts
violates due process.
One further observation. The substantive sentencing law should be simple
and uncomplicated. This means that the Commission should refrain from
amending the guidelines and policy statements, unless amendment is absolutely
necessary. In short, the Commission should let the law settle a bit.
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PANEL 3: THE ALLOCATION OF DISCRETION UNDER THE GUIDELINES
Moderator: Daniel J. Freed, Clinical Professor of Law and Its Administration,
Yale Law School
Professor Gerard E. Lynch, Professor of Law, Columbia University; former
Chief of the Criminal Division of the Office of the U.S. Attorney, New York
The guidelines have shifted the locus of discretion from the judge to the
prosecutor. This transfer has drastically changed sentencing because the
prosecutor's role is very different from the judge's role.
Before the guidelines, the prosecutor's role in sentencing was minimal. The
prosecutor could put a cap on the sentence by accepting a plea to a charge with
a low maximum, but there was virtually no instance in which the charge would
put a floor under the judge's sentence. The judge, on the other hand, could sen-
tence however he liked. Not only was the judge's decision correct because it
was final-there was no appellate review of sentences within the statutory
maximum-it was correct because there was no law by which it could be called
incorrect. Absent a few factors that were statutorily excluded from consider-
ation, the judge could take into account any factor he thought relevant, and
weigh it to whatever degree he thought it counted. The judge could be harsh
or lenient, a retributivist or a utilitarian, a believer in deterrence or rehabilita-
tion.
The guidelines have put an end to the judge's discretion. Instead, they have
enhanced the power of the prosecutor. The factors that count for the guidelines
are factual issues, and the prosecutor is more or less the master of the facts in
a criminal case. The prosecutor knows more about the legally provable facts
than anybody else, and the prosecutor has legal control over what facts will be
asserted. However, it is not the case that the prosecutor has the same discretion,
or as significant discretion, as judges had under the ancien rigime. By moving
the locus of the discretion, the guidelines have changed the nature of the discre-
tion, the constraints under which it is exercised, and the issues with which that
discretion will be concerned.
The discretion accorded to sentencing judges under pre-guidelines law was
explicitly and intentionally sentencing discretion. Its purpose was to determine
the appropriate sentence for the particular individual convicted of a crime; it
was clearly correctional and punitive. In contrast, the prosecutor's discretion
under the guidelines regime is intimately bound up with the traditional charging
discretion of the prosecutor, a discretion that has its own logic and purposes.
The prosecutor is not expressly or overtly entrusted with any discretion at all
over sentencing; rather, he is given the authority to charge or not to charge
particular offenses, to assert or omit particular facts or arguments. While the
2066 [Vol. 101: 2053
Conference Summary
power to influence sentencing does not disappear because it is not expressly
acknowledged, there is a critical difference between having acknowledged,
authorized, and legitimated discretion and having covert discretion. Prosecutors
are not only interested in obtaining a particular sentence for the defendant; they
are also interested in making a formal record of the results of governmental
investigations.
A prosecutor today, under the guidelines, may have the effective power to
reduce a sentence by underselling the charge, but such an act may well be at
odds with the prosecutor's other objectives in determining the charges. This
intrinsic distinction between overt and covert sentencing discretion profoundly
affects the nature of the decision that will be made. The guidelines have done
more than merely shift the locus of the discretion to a different decisionmaker;
they have turned the nature of decisionmaking from a pure sentencing decision
into something else.
The prosecutor is not free to dispense mercy at will. The judge has the
power to thwart unwarranted leniency, to order the prosecutor to put on facts,
and to reject a plea agreement. According to the guidelines, a judge may only
accept a plea agreement if she is convinced that the sentence is within the
applicable guidelines range or if "the agreed sentence departs from the applica-
ble guideline range for justifiable reasons." 10 In other words, a judge is not
supposed to approve a plea bargain unless the agreed-upon sentence is a
guideline sentence. We have not yet seen judges moving against prosecutorial
seizure of authority, but the tool is there.
More importantly, the issues that will principally determine the prosecutor's
choice will often have more to do with the strength of the prosecutor's case
than with abstract arguments of justice and mercy. Although some prosecutors,
gauging appropriate sentence length by what they are used to, find the guide-
lines draconian, future prosecutors will inevitably come (as will future judges)
to internalize the guideline sentences as presumptively correct. While circum-
stances will occasionally warrant overt or covert departures, the most significant
motivator of agreement will be the existence of bona fide factual disputes about
the applicable facts (both as to guilt and guidelines issues), the perceived
likelihood of success in proving one side of the dispute version, and the
resources necessary to be expended to accomplish that. To move the sentence
up imposes costs on the prosecutor that were not borne by a judge sentencing
under a non-guidelines regime--costs that the prosecutor might well choose
not to bear. This is indeed an inevitable part of a guidelines system. By making
the sentence turn on specified factual and legal issues, the guidelines invite the
prosecutor and defense lawyer to estimate the likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of those issues and consider the expected value of the sentence in light
of those estimates. In such an atmosphere, what is likely to drive leniency is
10. U.S. SENENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(c)(2) (1992).
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not considered judgment about appropriate sentences (whether right or wrong),
but judgments about whether compromise is forced by the strength of the
prosecutor's litigation position.
By constraining the judge's sentencing discretion, guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentences have enhanced the prosecutor's influence over the sentence.
But to say that this has somehow shifted the judge's sentencing discretion to
a different actor (who may or may not be less wise in its use) is an oversimpli-
fication. What the prosecutor now has is a discretion significantly different,
more complicated, and more constrained than the discretion formerly exercised
by judges.
Steven M. Salky, Partner, Zuckerman, Spaeder, Taylor, Goldstein & Kolker,
Washington, D.C.; Chairman, ABA Sentencing Guidelines Committee
From the viewpoint of most defense attorneys, the federal sentencing
guidelines have marked a step backward in the imposition of fair and just
punishment. Regardless of whether or not the guidelines have served the cause
of justice, it is undeniable that defense attorneys feel robbed of power as a
result. Three primary reasons explain this phenomenon.
First, the process has been dehumanized because offender characteristics
and situational factors have been largely removed from consideration at sentenc-
ing. Defense attorneys under the old system had significant control over the
presentation of the human dimensions of the case and, as a result, were often
able to influence the outcome. With the elimination of human factors from
sentencing and, to a large extent, plea bargaining, this typical form of advocacy
has been lost. Second, the ability of the courts to impose creative sentences has
been virtually eliminated. While there is authority to depart, the approved
grounds for departure are so narrow that they eviscerate the defense attorney's
power to persuade the court to adopt a creative alternative sentence. Third, there
is no doubt that the guidelines have increased the power of the prosecutor. This
increased power is most evident when it comes to cooperation, the primary
escape valve from the otherwise harsh mandatory minimum sentencing system
being adopted by Congress. The defense attorney is somewhat superfluous when
the defendant is cooperating, and cooperation has become the primary manner
in which defendants avoid harsh sentences.
This is not to say that there are not avenues for effective advocacy under
the guidelines. Because the factors that will determine the sentence all relate
to the client's conduct and the harm intended or caused, and because the weight
such factors carry can be identified with specificity, fact bargaining remains
critical. Fact bargaining has always been a critical part of the system, but its
importance is elevated in a system where judicial discretion is narrow. Now
more than ever before, the defense attorney's focus must be on persuading the
prosecutor.
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Maria Rodriguez McBride, Chief U.S. Probation Officer for the District of
Connecticut
Federal probation officers agree that their role in the sentencing process
has changed significantly under the guidelines. There is no consensus, however,
on exactly how the role has changed and whether those changes are positive
or negative.
The primary duty of the probation officer in the sentencing process is to
prepare the presentence investigation report and make a recommendation to the
court for sentencing. Prior to the guidelines, probation officers compiled their
information by obtaining details of the offense from the U.S. Attorney's file,
interviewing the case agent, and interviewing the defendant. The body of the
probation officer's report consisted of information about the defendant's prior
record and social history. The officer generally attempted to understand the
defendant and his reasons for involvement in the offense, and tried to arrive
at a prognosis for the defendant's ability to rehabilitate. The report was then
submitted to the sentencing judge. The probation officer would meet with the
judge prior to the sentencing hearing to discuss the report and the officer's
recommendation. The probation officer's power in this process lay in her ability
to influence the judge with respect to the outcome of the sentencing.
The implementation of the guidelines has decreased the sentencing judge's
discretion in sentencing. This reduction has in turn diminished the probation
officer's role by reducing the officer's ability to influence the outcome of the
sentence. In addition, the guidelines have altered the presentence report, nega-
tively affected the probation officer's ability to obtain information relevant to
sentencing, and significantly increased the amount of time needed to complete
an investigation. Probation officers report difficulty in gaining access to the
U.S. Attorney's file and even greater difficulty in getting information from
defendants. Defense attorneys are reportedly advising their clients against full
cooperation and often will not allow them to discuss the offense with the
probation officer due to a concern that the client might provide information that
could result in a higher guideline range. Consequently, the probation officer
is left with a version of the offense that is less complete than in pre-guidelines
cases and a social history that is severely lacking. Unfortunately, the failure to
provide this type of information can result in a more severe sentence because
the defendant's story is never presented to the court, and the officer has no
personal information about the defendant on which to base a recommendation
for downward departure.
The current presentence reports reflect our present sad state of affairs. Prior
to the guidelines, the presentence report provided an assessment of the entire
individual, including personal characteristics. The guidelines place greater
emphasis on the offense behavior and the individual's prior criminal record and
minimize individual characteristics. The guideline range is calculated on the
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offense behavior and the criminal record before any personal information about
the defendant is presented. Personal characteristics are considered relevant only
for departures, and probation officers tend to believe that departures are permit-
ted in very few cases. Officers hesitate to make departure recommendations on
untried grounds due to inexperience and uncertainty, and judges are similarly
reluctant to follow departure recommendations for fear of being overturned.
Although the guidelines have changed the probation officer's role in the
sentencing process and in some ways have diminished the officer's power, most
probation officers approve of the guidelines. Learning how to fashion an
appropriate recommendation for a sentence has always been one of the most
difficult tasks for officers. Guidelines that consider relevant information and
then provide a sentencing range make the officer's task easier. Officers agree,
however, that judicial discretion with options for departure is necessary for a
fair guidelines system. Individual characteristics and offender needs are crucial
to sentencing decisions. In addition, probation officers need full cooperation
and participation by the defendant and defense attorney during the presentence
investigation in order to present the court with a balanced report and to provide
any and all information that might warrant a departure.
Judge Vincent L. Broderick, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York
While the guidelines have taken some power away from judges, judges still
retain ultimate power over sentencing. Spectators at New York Knicks games
in the late 1960's used to chant: "Defense! Defense! Defense!" Today's mes-
sage for sentencing judges is: "Depart! Depart! Depart!" Departures are the
lifeblood of the sentencing guidelines process.
This message needs to reach four audiences. First, the Commission. The
Commission needs better information and better guidance on how to develop
the guidelines. Second, the courts of appeals. They are likewise in need of
education. They need to learn more about the power and the duty of district
judges to depart. Third, district judges. District courts must exercise their
departure power, and when they do depart, they need to explain their reasons
adequately. Fourth, defense counsel. Defense attorneys must learn to present
arguments for departures. Federal defenders know and understand the guide-
lines, and they are beginning to chart out the statutory underpinnings of the
guidelines and the implications these have for arguments.
Another group that the guidelines significantly affect is probation officers.
The Commission has made a very conscious effort to change the role of the
probation officer. While probation officers have a much more difficult and
technical role under the guidelines, they are still an arm of the court and should
help the court in reaching sentencing decisions.
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The guidelines have downplayed characteristics that judges found relevant
in the past, such as family, employment, and community ties. Under the
guidelines, these factors are no longer considered "ordinarily relevant." They
may not seem relevant in the abstract, but for each particular defendant, they
are extremely relevant. They affect the defendant's prison assignment and the
information available to the probation officer for the supervisory phase.
The guidelines have not effected any real shift in power, but they have
changed the roles of the players in the sentencing process. Each of these players
needs to learn to work with, through, and around the guidelines better.
PANEL 4: THE FUTURE OF THE GUIDELINES
Moderator: Stanton Wheeler, Ford Foundation Professor of Law and the Social
Sciences, Yale Law School
Judge Nathaniel R. Jones, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
The guidelines represent incursions into constitutional protections. Before
the 1970's, the number of black and minority Article III judges was minuscule.
In fact, before the Kennedy Administration, there was only one black Article
III judge. Kennedy and the Presidents who followed him, especially President
Carter, added many minority judges to the bench. As a result of these changes
on the bench, the minority community began to change its perspective on the
law, seeing it as an instrument for promoting equality rather than an obstacle
to equality. The judiciary was becoming more sensitive to problems of race and
the law.
Unfortunately, the guidelines have stripped judges of their ability to consid-
er human factors in sentencing. The role of the judge has been marginalized.
Instead of judicial discretion, the guidelines have placed tremendous discretion
in the hands of investigative agents, prosecutors, and probation officers-often
people with hardly any real life experience. The rationale and justification for
the guidelines was to rid the system of disparity, partly in order to close the
sentence gap between the poor and the affluent. Instead, they have created a
multimillion dollar bureaucratic nightmare. We delude ourselves if we think
that the guidelines have brought uniformity to the sentencing process and ended
disparity. Indeed, one of the consequences of the guidelines has been an
acceleration of the incarceration rate of minorities and the poor. Presently, one
quarter of black males from twenty to twenty-nine years old are either in prison,
on probation, or on parole. This is a higher proportion than the percentage of
black males in college.
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The constitutionality of the guidelines is doubtful. Although the Supreme
Court addressed the separation of powers issue in Mistretta," it has not yet
considered due process and confrontation issues. The guidelines may be uncon-
stitutional on these grounds. The guidelines are also ill-conceived, ill-drafted,
and ill-advised. Rather than trying to make sense out of them, courts should
strive for a principled way to raise the constitutionality of the guidelines, and
force the Supreme Court to address these issues directly.
Until these constitutional arguments are addressed, courts of appeals should
insist that district judges exercise the discretion they have. Judges should set
forth reasons for departing and should do so when appropriate. If district courts
did this, we could at least mitigate the extreme injustice occurring under the
guidelines.
Judge Jon 0. Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The value of the guidelines has not yet been proven. We hear a profusion
of assertions as to what the guidelines do and don't do, but we lack data on
which to make sensible judgments. Because of the political climate, we will
have to live with the guidelines, and therefore the most profitable tactic is to
think about what reforms to undertake. We should direct our concerns to the
Commission, which has a broad mandate under a flexible (and somewhat
contradictory) statute.
It is more useful to ask the Commissioners to change the guidelines than
it is to demand the abolition of them. The Commission has recently proposed
for comment an amendment to the current provision that only the government
may make a motion for departures based on the defendant's cooperation.
Congress said that there must be a government motion for cooperation depar-
tures below mandatory minimums, but did not set this requirement for other
cooperation departures. Yet Congress did instruct the Commission to take
cooperation into account in general, so it was at least content with permitting
departures for cooperation without a government motion, except in cases of
mandatory minimums. The Commission should carry out the intent of Congress
to rectify this unwarranted imbalance of power. Doing so would be a clear
demonstration that the Commission is truly, as its authorizing statute contem-
plates, "an independent commission in the judicial branch.' 12
One fundamental mistake was the Commission's attempt to fashion a
uniform mechanism for determining sentences according to every detail of a
crime. This "incremental immorality" theory is lunacy. For example, the
guidelines table for sentencing drug crimes sets two to three grams at level
twenty, three to four grams at level twenty-two, four to five grams at level
11. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
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twenty-four, and so on. Every two levels adds a year in jail. This system is
ludicrous because the number of grams a defendant happens to possess at the
moment of arrest has nothing to do with her morality or culpability. Similarly,
a thief who commits a typical larceny has no idea how much he is stealing
when he commits the crime, but is punished according to the amount of money
involved, although his intent was simply to take whatever money he found. The
sentence distinctions up and down the drug table and the monetary table are
ridiculous.
Why did the Commission adopt these overly refined tables? There are three
possible reasons. First, the Commission may have followed Paul Robinson's
theory that a defendant should receive some extra punishment for every degree
of wrongdoing. This theory justifies differential punishment in the criminal
system as a general matter, but minute application of the theory is absurd.
Second, the Commission may have responded to the pressure of statisticians
to avoid discontinuities in sentencing. A smooth table of sentencing gradations
avoids discontinuities. Yet discontinuities can also be solved by allowing greater
sentencing ranges rather than by mandating incremental sentences. Third, the
Commission responded to Congress' demands about the breadth of sentencing
ranges. Congress stated that the top of a range can be no more than twenty-five
percent above the bottom of the range. The statute says nothing, however, about
the structure by which to reach the range. The Commission should have trusted
judicial discretion to adjust modifications that lead to an applicable sentencing
range. Too much discretion risks taking us back to the evils of the pre-guide-
lines system, but we can and should find a place for discretion between the two
poles of unfettered discretion and no discretion.
Two further issues that the Commission should revisit include the count
of conviction and relevant conduct. These factors matter above all else in
sentencing. Characteristics of the offender, other than criminal record, are
substantially ignored under the guidelines. Similarly, the guidelines' approach
to measuring relevant conduct is seriously flawed. It measures all relevant
conduct against the same scale, whether or not the defendant has been tried and
convicted for the conduct. This is bad penology and bad morality. It is a rigid
and cumbersome approach that understandably frustrates district judges.
These concerns do not, however, mean that we should abandon the guide-
lines. We should instead advise the Commission to reduce the rigidity of the
guidelines system. The system should be made simpler and more flexible. A
reformed system of guidelines could be better than the old system of unfettered
discretion. We should undertake the research and analysis necessary to make
sensible reforms.
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Professor Dennis E. Curtis, Robert C. and Nanette T. Packard Professor of
Clinical Legal Education, University of Southern California
Although we do not have enough data to make an informed judgment about
the effectiveness of the guidelines in reducing sentence disparity, the anecdotal
evidence and the limited statistical evidence we do have are worth our attention.
There are many horror stories under the guidelines that are just as bad as those
told to illustrate the deficiencies of the prior system.
There are two problems with the guidelines. First, discretion under the
guidelines is frontloaded, rather than distributed throughout the system. Police
and prosecutors now exercise the bulk of discretion available within the system,
and there is no effective review of the ways that they exercise their discretion.
On the other end, the guidelines severely restrict judicial discretion. Parole,
which was available to smooth out some of the disparities resulting from
judicial excesses, has been abolished. "Good time," administered by the Bureau
of Prisons, used to account for one-third to nearly one-half of sentences, but
has been slashed to fifteen percent of most sentences.
Prosecutors and enforcement agencies are not loath to exercise their
newfound power, sometimes with disturbing results. For example, drug enforce-
ment agents can structure undercover deals in ways that will affect the elements
of a case. An undercover agent may insist upon a deal with a small supplier
of cocaine for five rather than three kilos, which results in a guideline increase
of about four years for a defendant with no previous record. Similarly, an agent
can arrange for drug deals near schools, leading to increased sentences under
mandatory minimum laws. Unchecked prosecutorial discretion can also have
severe racial impact. A recent series of massive "schoolyard" busts in Los
Angeles resulted in over ninety indictments. All except one defendant were
black or Latino.
A second problem is that there is no real way to correct unfair or inappro-
priate sentences (as opposed to illegal sentences) after they are imposed.
Sentences within the guidelines are presumptively legal, even though they may
discriminate unfairly among codefendants, or may result from slanted or biased
presentence reports, or may not take into account significant cooperation by a
defendant. Sentences are also much longer, both in years imposed and in time
served, than they were prior to the guidelines. Our federal prisons are filling
up with more and more prisoners with longer and longer sentences. A twenty-
year-old first offender with a sentence of thirty years (or more) is no longer
a rarity. Average sentences in the federal system have increased from twenty-six
to sixty-seven months over the past few years.
We will come to regret our reliance on long sentences. Our present rate
of incarceration will have severe implications for our society. We are creating,
through long terms of imprisonment, a disabled and infantilized class of people
who will have severe problems adjusting to the free community when they are
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released. Time in prison is not making people more useful, more caring, or
more likely to treat other people fairly and honestly. Moreover, people in prison
are not really "removed from society." They are connected to families, friends,
church groups, and other organizations. They live in daily contact with their
keepers, whose ranks are also growing. In short, they are us and we are them.
Judges should be brought back into the picture. Judges have historically
determined what due process means. Even though limited by guideline re-
straints, judges should decide what evidentiary standards to apply, determine
methods of factfinding and find facts (especially facts about cooperation), and
supervise and set limits on prosecutorial discretion.
The Commission should cut the guidelines loose from mandatory minimum
sentences. Guidelines and mandatories are incompatible sentencing methods,
and the Commission should decide for itself what appropriate punishments
should be. The Commission should also commence research about what time
in prison does to people. If we could better understand the damage done by
incarceration, we would better know how to balance the harms of incapacitation
against its assumed benefits to society.
Judge Vincent L. Broderick, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York
I support the Judicial Conference position to work to make the guidelines
effective. While I have every confidence that we will be able to make them
effective, this effort will require a great deal of attention.
One potential problem with the guidelines is that they have produced an
increase in long prison terms. Supervised release of these prisoners will be very
burdensome. It will also be difficult for the system to reform the guidelines
because prisoners will want to be resentenced under more lenient standards, and
there will be a rush of habeas writs for this purpose. Clarifying the guidelines
will be a terrible production and will become a big area for litigation.
The Commission's proposed amendments, such as the amendmit to allow
the defense to move for reduction based on cooperation, are not necessarily the
Commission's own recommendations. Some are from the Department of Justice,
some are from defense counsel, and some are from the Judicial Conference.
The proposal to permit substantial assistance departures without a government
motion is a good one, but it is not one of the amendments suggested by the
Judicial Conference. The amendments proposed by the Judicial Conference over
a year and a half ago are crucial to making the guidelines effective. They
include a proposal to provide further opportunities for probation at lower levels
and other similar adjustments. If the Commission acts on these proposals, we
will have reason to be hopeful about continued cooperation between the Com-
mission and the judiciary. This cooperation is necessary to improve the guide-
lines.
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